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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1836, 12-2225 & 12-2556 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ARTHUR LEE DAVIS, 
    Appellant in No. 12-1836 
 
 
MOHAMMED MUSTAKEEM, 
    Appellant in No. 12-2225 
 
 
WILLIE GENE GULLEY, JR., A/K/A HEAD, A/K/A MOSES, 
    Appellant in No. 12-2556 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Nos. 2:07-cr-00077; 2:07-cr-00164; 3:05-cr-00016 ) 
District Judges: Honorable Joy F. Conti & Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 13, 2013 
____________ 
 
 
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 24, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 In this consolidated appeal, Arthur Davis, Mohammed Mustakeem, and Willie 
Gene Gulley, Jr., appeal their 120-month sentences for cocaine base offenses. Defendants 
contend that the current statutory mandatory minimum of 5 years should apply in their 
reduction in sentence hearings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), rather than the old 
120-month statutory mandatory minimum that had been effective on the date of their 
initial sentencings. For reasons stated in prior opinions of this Court, we affirm.  
I.  
 Davis pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a 
mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base, commonly known 
as “crack,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). On December 
11, 2007, he was sentenced to a term of 121 months imprisonment and five years of 
supervised release. Muskateem pleaded guilty to the same offenses, and on February 6, 
2008, he was sentenced to a term of 121 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised 
release. Gulley pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine 
base and less than 100 grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The District 
Court initially sentenced Gulley to 151 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised 
release. However, on September 8, 2008, Gulley received the benefit of an amendment to 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and he was re-sentenced to 121 months imprisonment. 
At the time of sentencing, each defendant was subject to a statutory mandatory minimum 
of 120 months because of the amount of cocaine base involved. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006). 
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 On August 3, 2010, the President signed the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”), P.L. 
111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, into law, which increased the quantities of cocaine base 
necessary to trigger the statutory mandatory minimums from 5 grams to 28 grams for the 
60-month mandatory minimum, and from 50 grams to 280 grams for the 120-month 
mandatory minimum. 21 U.S.C. § 841. The FSA also authorized the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to promulgate amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to conform 
them to the FSA. See 28 U.S.C. § 994. Subsequently, the Commission promulgated such 
amendments, and, on November 21, 2011, exercised its independent authority to make 
those amendments retroactive. See U.S.S.G. App. C, amd. 750 (new guidelines); 
U.S.S.G. App. C., amd. 759 (retroactivity).  
 Following the retroactive amendments to the Guidelines, each defendant filed a 
motion for a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). This statute provides a 
limited avenue for a defendant to seek modification of his sentence when he “‘has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently 
been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)’ and made 
retroactive pursuant to § 994(u).” Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 
2690 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). Absent the operation of any statutory 
mandatory minimums, Davis’s new guidelines range is 84 to 105 months, Muskateem’s 
is 63 to 78 months, and Gulley’s is 84 to 105 months. Each sought a reduction in 
sentence to the low end of his new Guidelines range. While the District Courts found the 
Defendants were entitled to the benefit of the new Guidelines amendments under 
§ 3582(c)(2), the District Courts also held that the 120-month statutory mandatory 
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minimum, in place at the time of their initial sentencings, prevented any reduction below 
120 months. Accordingly, the District Court reduced all three Defendants’ sentences to 
120 months. Defendants appeal the determination that the District Court was required to 
impose the pre-FSA statutory mandatory minimums at their reduction in sentence 
hearings.   
II. 
For the reasons set forth in this Court’s precedential opinion in United States v. 
Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2010) we will affirm. In Reevey we decided that 
the new statutory mandatory minimums contained in the FSA are not retroactive to those 
who, like Defendants, were sentenced before the FSA’s effective date of August 3, 2010. 
Furthermore, in United States v. Turlington, 696 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2012), we also 
reviewed, and rejected, the argument that Reevey was abrogated by the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Dorsey v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2321 (2012). Dorsey 
held that the new statutory mandatory minimums do apply retroactively to those whose 
crimes occurred before the effective date of the FSA, but who were sentenced after its 
effective date. 132 S. Ct. at 2335. In Turlington, we stated that Dorsey “addresses only 
the applicability of the FSA to those defendants who were convicted of crack cocaine 
offenses prior to the FSA’s effective date of August 3, 2010, but were sentenced after that 
date. It does not address, or disturb, the basic principle that the FSA does not apply to 
those defendants who were both convicted and sentenced prior to the effective date of the 
FSA.” 696 F.3d at 428. 
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Given these prior precedential cases in our Circuit, we are compelled to affirm the 
orders of the District Courts. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Courts’ orders entered on March 
9, 2012, April 12, 2012, and May 14, 2012 reducing Defendants’ sentences to 120 
months.  
